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bstract
his study analyzes how foreign multinational enterprises respond to uncertainty in their cross-border acquisitions in emerging economies and,
pecifically in Brazil, given the institutional differences that separate the home and host countries. We analyze how institutional distance impacts
ultinational enterprises strategy in taking a partial or full ownership stake in their Brazilian acquisitions. We propose that the equity stake is a
trategic response to the uncertainty of operating in institutionally distant countries. In an study based on secondary data of 736 acquisitions between
008 and 2012, we tested statistically the relation between nine dimensions of institutional distance and the equity stake acquired. Results show
ifferentiated effects albeit with significant evidence that greater geographic distance lead multinational enterprises to take a partial equity stake,
hile financial and cultural distance leads to a full acquisition. This study has two contributions: reinforces the understanding of the institutional
hallenges of entering emerging economies, and puts forth how firms’ strategies may incorporate structural solutions that minimize risks and
nvestments when facing institutional uncertainties.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
eywords: Institutional environment; Institutional distance; Cross-border acquisitions; Brazil; Uncertainty reduction strategy
esumoste artigo analisa a forma como as empresas multinacionais (EMNs) estrangeiras respondem à incerteza nas aquisic¸ões de empresas em economias
mergentes e, especificamente, no Brasil, face às diferenc¸as institucionais que separam os países de origem e destino dos investimentos. Analisamos
omo a distância institucional impacta a estratégia das multinacionais estrangeiras na tomada de propriedade parcial ou total do capital nas aquisic¸ões
o Brasil. Propomos que o grau de propriedade é uma resposta estratégica diante da incerteza de operar em mercados institucionalmente mais
istantes. Num estudo baseado em dados secundários de 736 aquisic¸ões realizadas entre 2008 e 2012, testamos estatisticamente a relac¸ão entre
ove dimensões de distância institucional e o grau de propriedade adquirido. Os resultados mostram efeitos diferenciados, mas com evidência
ignificativa que maior distância geográfica conduz à tomada de posse parcial, enquanto maior distância financeira e cultural à tomada de posse∗ Corresponding author at: Morro do Lena, Alto Vieiro, 2411-901 Leiria, Portugal.
E-mail: manuel.portugal.ferreira@gmail.com (M.A. Ferreira).
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total. Este estudo tem duas contribuic¸ões: reforc¸a o entendimento dos desafios institucionais de entrar em economias emergentes, e propõe como
as estratégias das empresas podem incorporar modos estruturais que minimizam riscos e investimentos em relac¸ão as incertezas institucionais.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Ambiente institucional; Distância institucional; Aquisic¸ões internacionais de empresas; Brasil; Estratégia de reduc¸ão de incerteza
Resumen
En este artigo se analiza cómo las empresa multinacionales (EMNs) extranjeras responden a la incertidumbre en las adquisiciones de empresas en
economías emergentes y, específicamente, en Brasil, ante las diferencias institucionales que separan los países de origen y destino de las inversiones.
Se evalúa cómo la distancia institucional influye en la estrategia de las multinacionales extranjeras en la toma de propiedad parcial o total del
capital en las adquisiciones en Brasil. Se propone que el grado de propiedad es una respuesta estratégica frente a la incertidumbre de operar en
mercados institucionalmente más lejanos. En un estudio con base en datos secundarios de 736 adquisiciones realizadas entre 2008 y 2012, se ha
puesto estadísticamente a prueba la relación entre nueve dimensiones de distancia institucional y el nivel de propiedad adquirido. Los resultados
muestran efectos diferenciados, pero con evidencia significativa de que mayores distancias geográficas conducen a la toma de propiedad parcial,
mientras que una mayor distancia financiera y cultural conduce a la toma de propiedad total. Este estudio aporta dos contribuciones: subraya el
entendimiento de los desafíos institucionales de entrar en economías emergentes, y propone cómo las estrategias de las empresas pueden incorporar
formas estructurales que disminuyan riesgos e inversiones frente a las incertidumbres institucionales.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palabras clave: Ambiente institucional; Distancia institucional; Adquisiciones internacionales de empresas; Brasil; Estrategia de disminución de incertidumbre
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introduction
This paper analyzes the association between institutional dis-
ance among countries and the degree of equity ownership to
educe institutional uncertainty in the cross-border acquisitions
y multinational corporations (MNCs) in an emerging economy.
pecifically the strategic response researched is the degree of
quity ownership based on the premise that an acquisition may
nvolve either a partial or a full equity stake in the acquired firm
Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Phene, Tallman, & Almeida, 2012).
his paper thus analyses the association between institutional
istance and the strategy of undertaking a partial or full acqui-
ition by foreign MNCs in an emerging economy, specifically
razil.
Albeit MNCs hold firm-specific advantages (Rugman,
erbeke, & Nguyen, 2011; Verbeke & Brugman, 2009) that
llows them to overcome the liabilities of foreignness (Meyer,
udambi, & Narula, 2011; Zaheer, 1995), those advantages may
ave limited used when exposed to institutional environments
hat depart more substantially from the home country (Rugman
t al., 2011), such as in emerging economies (Beule, Elia, &
iscitello, 2014). In these markets, MNCs are more susceptible
o the disadvantages of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). These are
isadvantages related to a lack of knowledge on the “normal”
ays of conducting business, lack of legitimacy, unfamiliarity
ith the normative, regulatory and cognitive aspects (Kostova,
999). The disadvantages require that firms formulate a strate-
ic response that promotes access to the host country’s specific
dvantages (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Rugman et al., 2011)
nd, simultaneously, protects the MNC from the institutional
nsufficiencies of the host countries (Peng, Wang, & Jiang,
008), in particular in the emerging economies. It is thus reason-
ble that the strategy for each acquisition will differ (Ferreira,
007; Phene et al., 2012), as it is reasonable to suggest that the
I
d
oegree of equity acquired in each acquisition – partial or full –
eeds to be adjusted not only to the strategic objectives but also
o the external institutional uncertainties and risks.
Partial acquisitions have been treated in the literature as effec-
ive manners to avoid a loss of value post-acquisition (Dyer,
ale, & Singh, 2004; Ferreira, 2007; Vermeulen & Barkema,
001), as means to absorb the target firm specific knowledge and
earn in institutionally distant environments (Jakobsen & Meyer,
008; Phene et al., 2012). However, the literature is scarce in
evealing how the structural form of the acquisition – in this
tudy focusing only the degree of equity ownership – may be
een as a strategy to reduce institutional uncertainty. Thus, in
his paper, we examine one specific aspect of a structural solu-
ion in the acquisition strategy. That is, how the institutional
istance between countries impact the degree of ownership
n cross-border acquisitions. We further propose that the nine
imensions of institutional distance described and measured by
erry, Guillen, and Zhou (2010) – cultural, economic, finan-
ial, political, administrative, demographic, knowledge, global
onnections and geographic – are positively related with under-
aking a full cross-border acquisition in emerging economies,
sing the case of cross-border acquisitions in Brazil.
This study was based on secondary data collected from the
DC Platinum  of acquisitions in Brazil between 2008 and 2012.
he institutional dimensions considered followed the taxonomy
f institutional distances of Berry et al. (2010). The sample
omprised 736 acquisitions of Brazilian firms by foreign multi-
ationals.
The results reveal that the impact of institutional distance
s not uniform and it is necessary to understand the differential
nfluences played by each institutional facet on firms’ strategies.
n particular, the financial, cultural and geographic institutional
imensions emerged as determinants of the degree of equity
wnership, influencing the likelihood that foreign MNCs will
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ndertake a full acquisition of the Brazilian firms, over a partial
quity stake. Hence, in conditions of high institutional uncer-
ainty, the MNCs may prefer the internalization and control
ver the operations or share the responsibility with a partner,
epending on the specific institutional dimension considered.
This study contributes to the analysis on the impact of insti-
utional distances between countries in the strategic actions of
rms. We follow the rationale that the institutional environ-
ent is not deterministic and that firms may act strategically
see Kostova, 1999; Oliver, 1991, 1997; Peng et al., 2008).
t further contributes to integrate the literature on acquisitions
ith that on institutional distance, permitting to understand the
tructural solutions employed by the MNCs in entering emerg-
ng economies through acquisitions. We propose and test the
egree of equity ownership as a structural response to institu-
ional uncertainty in the host country. Thus, dialoguing with
he literature on entry modes, the results of this paper con-
ribute by going beyond the contrast among entry modes (Dikova
 Witteloostuijn, 2007) and researching different degrees of
wnership in acquisitions (Beule et al., 2014; Chari & Chang,
009). This study reveals that when the acquisitions involve
rms in emerging economies, the structural solution to reduce
ncertainty may be different from that portrayed in the literature.
s to practitioner implications, this study shows that firms may
eact using the best structural solution to minimize institutional
isks and uncertainties.
The paper has five sections. The first section comprises a
rief literature review and conceptual development. The second
ection describes the method, including data and variables. The
hird presents the results and is followed by a broad discussion on
he impact of institutional distance on cross-border acquisitions
nd on the equity ownership stake.
iterature  review  and  conceptual  development
egree  of  equity  ownership  in  acquisitions
Cross-border acquisitions are one of the primary forms firms
se to access other firms’ resources and advantages (Anand
 Kogut, 1997; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Ferreira, 2007;
ermeulen & Barkema, 2001) and location-specific advantages
Phene et al., 2012). An acquisition may involve different levels
f property – may be a full acquisition of 100% of the target
rm’s equity, or a partial acquisition that involves less than the
otality of the target firm’s equity (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998;
hen & Hennart, 2004). The different forms of acquisitions – full
r partial – are motivated by different exogenous factors (Chen,
008), but they also entail different levels of risk (Chapman,
003; Chen & Hennart, 2004), transfer of resource to and from
he acquired firm (Phene et al., 2012), and control over the for-
ign operations (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Jakobsen & Meyer,
008).
A partial acquisition may be preferred to access location-
pecific advantages that local firms absorbed. It may also be an
ntermediate step; that is, an initial investment that is followed
y the full acquisition of the target firm (Hoffmann & Schaper-
inkel, 2001). A partial acquisition possibly has the strategic
a
i
t
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bjective of absorbing the resources and capabilities of the target
rm, but in such manner as to prevent the loss of value post-
cquisition (Dyer et al., 2004; Ferreira, 2007). Hence, partial
cquisitions seem to be better to prospect resources and capabil-
ties not yet held (Phene et al., 2012), especially under conditions
f uncertainty. For example, Chen and Hennart (2004) confirmed
hat the propensity of the Japanese firms to acquire less than
he totality of the target firms in the USA was explained by a
ifficulty to assess the value of the acquisition.
In other turn, full acquisitions involve the intent of the
nvestor to keep the total control of the target firm (Jakobsen
 Meyer, 2008). The full ownership permits the total control
f the operations but it is not as effective as a partial acquisi-
ion to access complementary resources by sharing investments
nd risks (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Phene et al., 2012). The
eed for larger investments and greater exposure to the risks and
iabilities of foreignness are some of the costs associated to full
wnership (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Slangen & Hennart,
007). In addition to these disadvantages, there is the loss of
alue of the target’s assets post-acquisition (Dyer et al., 2004),
ue to a loss of human capital and knowledge. In this manner,
ull acquisitions seem to be the best strategic response to exploit
broad the portfolio of products, technologies and resources
cquired (Phene et al., 2012).
Hence, the degree of equity ownership depends on the
trategic objectives of the MNCs but these are not the only
eterminant. The conditions of institutional uncertainty are also
mportant drivers of the choice for undertaking a full or partial
cquisition.
nstitutional  environment  in  emerging  economies
The institutions are crucial to sustain the functioning of mar-
ets and reduce transaction costs (North, 1990) and, as noted by
eng et al. (2008), decrease the risks and define the boundaries
f what is taken as legitimate. The characteristics of the context
n which firms operate, or “the rules of the game” (North, 1990)
 the local institutional conditions (Peng et al., 2008) –, deter-
ine which strategies to deploy (Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng,
un, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009). Following the institutional the-
ry, the MNCs need to gain legitimacy (Dacin, 1997) in the
ost markets to survive and prosper, adapting to the prevailing
orms and systems of those markets (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983;
ostova, 1999; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; North, 1990).
The institutional environment – that includes such facets
s the legal system, regulatory, culture, protection of property
ights, among others – if developed sustains a market economy
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). In contrast, institu-
ional fragilities emerge, for instance, in the inability to provide
ffective and efficient regulatory mechanisms for the exchanges
hat end up generating uncertainty for the MNCs (Peng et al.,
009). For example, some countries may have legal restric-
ions to foreign investment constraining the full ownership of local firm (Delios & Beamish, 1999), while in other countries
t is the informal aspects such as a corruption permissive cul-
ure (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005) that ought to be
aken into consideration in decision making. Regardless of the
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pecific institutional dimension, institutional differences gen-
rate uncertainty and transaction costs that are barriers MNCs
eed to overcome. Hence, the quality of the institutional system
nfluence the uncertainties, costs and risks of operations and
hus determine the relative benefits of each foreign entry mode
Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004; Meyer, 2001).
Recent research has noted that in the emerging economies
he institutional matters are especially relevant given the pro-
ounced differences that distinguish these economies from their
ore developed counterparts (Gelbuda, Meyer & Delios, 2008;
hanna, Palepu, & Sindha, 2005; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Wright,
ilatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). The institutional con-
ext of the emerging economies is marked by institutional
ebilities – already termed as institutional  voids  - that con-
rast with the degree of institutional sophistication of the more
eveloped countries (Khanna et al., 2005; Meyer & Peng,
005).
The institutions are not specific to countries (Berry et al.,
010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016) and the institutional differences
etween countries augment the perceived risks and costs (Deng,
009), due to a lack of knowledge on how the local institutions
perate (Contractor, Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014). The more
ronounced the differences, the greater will be the uncertain-
ies concerning the local host market, partner’ resources, and
earning potential (Contractor et al., 2014). The acquisitions in
merging economies are thus more complex for MNCs from
eveloped countries due to: a less developed capital market, pool
f labor less qualified, less sophisticated legal infrastructure,
ureaucracy, inefficient enforcement of contracts, weak protec-
ion of property rights, corruption, etc. (Contractor et al., 2014;
eyer et al., 2009). The cultural characteristics of the emerg-
ng economies are also distinct from the developed countries and
anifest in such aspects as different attitudes, value systems and
ehaviors. Firms – suppliers, clients and competitors – in emerg-
ng economies tend to be (despite some cases of grand success
uch as JBS/Friboi, Embraer and Gerdau, all Brazilian firms)
nternationally little competitive (Khanna et al., 2005; Meyer
t al., 2009).
Give the institutional differences between countries,
esearchers have sought to understand the foreign entry strate-
ies deployed by MNCs in the emerging economies (Meyer
t al., 2009). Specifically, in this study we argue about the degree
f equity ownership in cross-border acquisitions given a set of
nstitutional distances, taking the specific case of Brazil as an
merging economy.
nstitutional  distance  and  the  degree  of  ownership  in
cquisitions
Research in international business has evolved beyond
escriptions of the countries’ institutional characteristics to
eek to understand the many dimensions (Ghemawat, 2001;
uisinger, 2001; Kostova, 1996; North, 1990) of institutional
istance – or difference – between countries (Berry et al., 2010;
ikova, Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010; Kostova, 1996;
orosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell,
005). The differences between countries have been measured
i
a
b
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sing the concept of institutional distance (Drogendijk & Martín,
015), that may be defined as the degree of similarity or dissim-
larity between the institutions of two countries. Some scholars
ave created taxonomies to characterize the institutional dimen-
ions, such as the CAGE model by Ghemawat (2001), the six
imensions by Dow and Karunaratna (2006) or the nine dimen-
ions by Berry et al. (2010). The importance of capturing the
ultidimensionality of the institutional environment has been
ighlighted by Berry et al. (2010, p. 1461) as: “defining and
easuring cross-national distance along multiple dimensions is
mportant, because different types of distance can affect firm,
anagerial or individual decisions in different ways, depend-
ng on the dimension of distance under examination”. In this
ein, Berry et al. (2010) proposed a taxonomy of nine dimen-
ions of institutional distance between countries: (1) economic,
2) financial, (3) political, (4) administrative, (5) cultural, (6)
emographic, (7) knowledge, (8) global connections, and (9)
eographic. This disaggregation of the construct of institutional
istance presents a more complete classification that encapsu-
ates other taxonomies (for instance, Ghemawat’s (2001) CAGE
odel) and thus permits a more detailed analysis of how the
ifferent facets of the institutional environment may influence
NCs’ strategies.
Albeit well established that MNCs use the foreign entry
odes best suited to the conditions of the host markets to
ain legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and be accepted
Dacin, 1997), the literature is not consensual on what is the
est strategic response to the institutional differences, or dis-
ances, although Oliver (1991, 1997) has suggested that MNCs
re not prisoners of their immediate institutional milieu. For
nstance, it is not straightforward how cross-borer acquisitions
ust be conducted, even if they are a commonly deployed
trategy for international growth (Hitt, Ireland, & Harrison,
001). Albeit reasonable to suggest that a possible strategic
ction under conditions of uncertainty may drive the equity
take acquired in an acquisition, the extant theory is not con-
ensual in pointing out what is the structural solution pertaining
he degree of equity ownership in conditions of institutional
ncertainty. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that
he institutional environment is likely to influence the level
f control desired for a given foreign operation (Kostova,
999).
When the home and host countries have similar institutional
nvironments, the MNCs will be more familiar with the “rules
f the game” (North, 1990). That is, the MNCs will suffer less
ncertainty and may adopt foreign entry modes involving higher
ommitment of resources (Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Kostova,
999). However, when the institutional distance increases, the
reater uncertainty increases the likelihood the MNCs seek
or partnerships with local firms to overcome the inefficien-
ies derived from weak institutions. Moreover, weak institutions
eighten the costs and risks of acquiring a local firm. Therefore,
he structural solution of undertaking a partial acquisition – tak-
ng only partial ownership on the target firm – may function as buffer to the institutional risks and uncertainties. A solution
ased on partial ownership would also be compatible with learn-
ng motivations and access to knowledge and specific assets of
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1 to 100% of the acquired firm but due to the dataset limita-
tions, we only consider whether the acquisition involves partM.A. Ferreira et al. / Revista d
he target firm and host country (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998;
erreira, 2007; Phene et al., 2012) while maintaining flexibility
Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004).
The structural solution to reduce uncertainty may be differ-
nt when the acquisitions involve firms in emerging economies,
han when involving firms in developed countries. In many
merging economies, the information asymmetries in opaque
arkets make more difficult to obtain information on potential
artners thus raising the risks of collaborating (Meyer, 2001).
 weak institutional framework, volatile and arbitrary, makes
mpracticable collaborative entry modes given, for instance, the
azards in guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts (Meyer,
001). The ability to regulate the partnership may also be
specially hindered in void institutional environments. In condi-
ions of high institutional uncertainty, maintaining a partnership
e.g., a partial acquisition) does not guarantee the ability to
vercome regulatory inefficiencies, arbitrary norms and bureau-
racy (Meyer, 2001; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008). Furthermore,
he institutional differences will likely jeopardize the internal
ransfer of knowledge and best practices to other subsidiaries
Kostova, 1996, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), discourag-
ng MNCs from seeking partial acquisitions to absorb new
nowledge in emerging economies. Hence, albeit acquiring a
rm in an emerging economy exposes the MNC to great man-
gement challenges of the acquired firm (Capron, Mitchell, &
waminathan, 2001); a partial acquisition also entails coor-
ination challenges and difficulties in managing the partners’
bjectives.
Delios and Beamish (1999), for example, have noted how
he partial ownership (specifically, the joint ventures) were a
eans to access the resources of the local firms, including
heir networks that help in overcoming the voids of a weak
nstitutional context. Notwithstanding, in high uncertainty con-
itions firms need to trust the ability to govern their partnerships
nd enforce contracts. Therefore the suggestion that the need
or a local partner decreases with the strengthening of the
nstitutional environment (Meyer, 2001) has another facet that
s the own ability to regulate the relationship between part-
ers, that is likely to be difficult in institutionally very weak
nvironments.
Combining these arguments it seems reasonable to sug-
est that an high, and idiosyncratic, institutional uncertainty
ssociate to entering emerging economies leads to maintain
nternalized the foreign operation resorting to a full acqui-
ition. This proposition follows Transaction Costs Theory
Williamson, 1985) that under conditions of uncertainty the
rms is likely to prefer maintaining internalized the opera-
ions. The institutional differences between investor and host
merging countries make integration, legitimacy and perfor-
ance more difficult for MNCs (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).
e thus propose that firms will prefer foreign entry modes
f greater commitment when the institutional differences are
arger. That is, the preferred foreign entry mode may be based
n fully controlling the subsidiary for greater institutional dis-
ances between the home and host countries. In other words, the
arger the distance, the higher the propensity to conduct a full
cquisition.
o
dinistração 52 (2017) 59–69 63
ethod
To collect the data and pursue the research goal we follow a
uantitative approach seeking to assess the ties between insti-
utional distance and the degree of equity ownership acquired.
e now describe the data collection procedures and sample,
nd detail de dependent, independent and control variables
mployed.
ata  collection  and  sample
The data was collected from secondary sources. Data per-
aining to the acquisitions of Brazilian firms by foreign MNCs
as extracted from SDC  Platinum  (Securities  Data  Company
latinum) – mergers  and  acquisitions. This is a database with
estricted access but widely used in prior studies (e.g., Capron
 Guillén, 2009; Capron & Shen, 2007). The database contains
ll acquisition deals with US firms as targets since 1979 and non
S since 1985 until present. From SDC  platinum, we collected
ata pertaining to the acquiring and acquired firms.
Data collection followed some procedures to select and
elimit the sample. First, we only want deals in which the target
rm is headquartered or located in Brazil and the acquiring firm
s foreign. Second, we excluded all deals involving MNCs in off-
hores. Third, we excluded all deals in which the current status
as unknown, rumors, intents and all sorts of ambiguous status.
ourth, we delimited the period to the acquisitions completed
etween 2008 and 2012. The period and the sample were selected
ntentionally to permit both a substantial sample for statistical
ests and to construct an acquisition experience variable with the
ata from 1985 to 2007. It is worth noting that we had access to
he data up to 2012 only. Fifth, we did not include deals involv-
ng an acquirer of the financial sector. Finally, we excluded the
eals with insufficient data in the variables of interest. Albeit
ery used this dataset is also very incomplete and often does
ot reveal values of acquisitions, percentages acquired and so
orth, and hence we have decided to dichotomize the dependent
ariable in full and partial acquisition.
With these procedures, we obtained a final sample of 736
cquisitions of Brazilian firms by foreign multinationals from
8 countries. The main investors were the USA, Canada, France
nd UK. 493 (or 67%) acquisitions involved undertaking a full
quity stake and 243 (33%) were partial acquisitions.
The data pertaining to the institutional distances between
he home countries of the MNCs and Brazil were collected
rom Berry et al. (2010), publicly available at http://lauder.
harton.upenn.edu/ciber/research/faculty.php# (Cross-national
istance data).
ariables
The dependent variable is the degree  of  equity  ownership
cquired. An acquisition may involve any level of equity fromr the totality of the target. This simplification does not jeopar-
ize the study since we do not propose associations that may be
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nriched scrutinizing the actual percentages of equity held. Data
or equity acquired was collected from SDC  Platinum  and coded
n a dichotomous variable such that 0 – partial acquisition and
 – full acquisition. Partial acquisitions involve less than 100%
f equity acquired.
ndependent  variables
The independent variables include the institutional distance
ssessed using Berry et al.’s (2010) taxonomy of nine dimen-
ions. The data used consisted in a distance for each institutional
imension between the home country of the acquirer MNC and
razil. It is worth noting that the majority of the acquirers were
rom developed countries.
Economic  distance  reveals differences in the degree of eco-
omic development and stability. We have used the values in
erry et al. (2010) calculated with such items as Gross domes-
ic product (GDP) per  capita, inflation, exports and imports of
he investor countries and Brazil. Financial  distance  assesses
rms’ capacity to finance their operations in the target country,
vailability and efficiency of the financial sector. Data was col-
ected from Berry et al. (2010) and include private credit (% of
DP), stock market capitalization (% of GDP) and number of
rms listed per million inhabitants. Political  distance  reflects
ifferences in the political system, stability and predictability of
he public policies, norms and regulations. The data collected
rom Berry et al. (2010) use indicators as uncertainty of poli-
ymaking, number of institutional actors, veto power, extent of
emocracy, size of government, and so forth. Data for admin-
strative distance  collected from Berry et al. (2010) include
spects such as common language, religion, colonial ties and
egal system. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) argued that a strong
egal system reduces the uncertainties.
Cultural  distance  has been one of the variables more often
sed in international business research and noted as an effective
easure of institutional differences among countries (Kogut &
ingh, 1988). Since data for culture was not available for Brazil
n Berry et al. we calculated cultural distance using Kogut and
ingh’s (1988) Euclidean distance and Hofstede’s (1980) four
rimary cultural dimensions. Albeit Hofstede’s taxonomy was
dded of two dimensions, (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Hofstede,
ofstede, & Minkov, 2010) there is not data available for many
ountries in these two dimensions.
Demographic  distance  expresses differences in demo-
raphic aspects among countries such as income, age, gender,
alaries, productivity, availability of labor (data from Berry
t al., 2010). Knowledge  distance  refers to differences of tech-
ological sophistication and generation of innovations among
ountries (Anand & Kogut, 1997). Data used from Berry et al.
2010) that used indicators such as the number of patents and
cientific papers published. Global  connections  distance, or
onnectivity between countries, shows differences in the level of
ntegration in the global economy, easing operations and reduc-
ng some cost factors (e.g., communications, trade, international
utsourcing), but is also an indicator of the quality of the infra-
tructure. Lastly, geographic  distance  that albeit not strictly
elated to institutional theory is a factor that is likely to reveal
l
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mportant differences between countries. Geographic distance
etween countries increase transportation costs and telecoms
Berry et al., 2010) and is an often-used proxy  to highlight that
ountries differ. We used Berry et al. (2010) data.
ontrol  variables
We have used a number of control variables capable of
nfluencing the degree of equity ownership in acquisitions. We
ontrolled for the size  of  the  acquirer  MNC  because larger firms
ave more available resources for undertaking a full acquisition
Beule et al., 2014; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Since the SDC  plat-
num does not include data on size such as assets, number of
orkers or other conventional measure, we used the number of
-digits SIC codes to proxy size (data from SDC Platinum). This
roxy is reasonable since we may expect that the larger the num-
er businesses the firms be involved in the larger they will be.
his variable was measured counting the number of different
IC codes of each firm, and varies between 1 and 14.
We also controlled for industry  because the specificities of
ach industry may interfere in the foreign investment strategies
f MNCs. For instance, it is possible that technological and pro-
uction aspects drive MNCs to protect, internalizing, their assets
hus using full acquisitions to expand. The industries were coded
s manufacturing, natural resources, services, trade and others.
ata for industry was extracted from SDC  Platinum. We fur-
her included a control for high  technology  to account for the
nowledge intensity of both acquirer and acquired firms. The
esource-Based view suggests that firms holding richer compe-
ences tend to prefer full control over the foreign operations,
amely as a manner to prevent unintended diffusion of knowl-
dge to competitors (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). We coded in a
ichotomous variable whether the firm is high technology (1) or
ot high technology (0) with data available in the SDC database
hat clearly specifies the firms high technology status.
We have also included a control for the degree of diversifica-
ion. This denotes the relative proximity between the businesses
f the acquirer and acquiring firms. If the acquisition involves
reater diversification then a potential motive would be to access
ovel knowledge, which is better executed with partial acquisi-
ions (Chari & Chang, 2009; Ferreira, 2007). Using data from
DC Platinum, we included two measures of diversification.
iversiﬁcation  of  the  core  primary  business  of the acquir-
ng firm compares the main business of the acquirer to the
ain business of the acquired firms using the main 4-digits
IC (Standard  Industrial  Classiﬁcation) of both firms. We have
onducted robustness tests for 3-digits SIC codes with similar
esults. General  diversiﬁcation  compared all businesses of each
rm to assess the degree of diversification for the acquiring MNC
hen comparing the entire portfolio of businesses. The two vari-
bles were coded dichotomously in 1 – acquisition entails some
iversification, and 0 – does not entail diversification.
Acquisition  experience  was controlled for because theiterature points that firms more experienced in conducting
cquisitions may prefer to conduct full acquisitions (Beule et al.,
014; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Meyer, 2001). Usually named as
cquisition capability this variable captures the accumulated
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earning in conducting acquisitions, which predictably decreases
he perceived risks in undertaking acquisitions. Acquisitions
xperience was measured summing the number of prior acqui-
itions each MNC had made in Brazil between 1985 (first year
vailable in SDC Platinum) and the focal acquisition. Given that,
e had only partial access to the database we could not calculate
 broader acquisition capability that considered all acquisitions
onducted by each MNC worldwide. Nonetheless, local expe-
ience is a more direct measure of relevant experience since
rior acquisitions in Brazil should diminish the MNCs sensi-
ivity to the local idiosyncrasies that are potential sources of
ncertainties. Data were collected from SDC.
Lastly, we used the year the acquisition was announced as a
ontrol to account for potential economic cycles capable of influ-
ncing our model. We included four variables for years 2008,
009, 2010 and 2011, using 2012 as the baseline.
esults
The statistical analysis involved multivariate techniques
sing a logistic regression. A logistic regression is appropri-
te to estimate the effects of a set of variables on a dichotomous
ependent variable. The tests analyze how the foreign MNCs
espond to institutional uncertainties in their acquisitions in
razil selecting different degrees of equity ownership on the tar-
et: full or partial. Table 1 presents the correlations matrix. The
orrelations are not as high as to raise multicollinearity concerns
nd the collinearity diagnosis (specifically the Variance  Inﬂation
actor – VIF) are lower than three. Thus, there is no evidence
f multicollinearity in the data.
Table 2 includes the results of the logistic regression for the
ependent variable: degree of equity acquired (full or partial).
odel 1 includes only the control variables. Models 2–10 add
ach of the measures of institutional distance separately. Model
1 is the complete model and includes all independent variables.
We highlight that the control variables for high technology of
he acquired and target firms are not significant which denotes
hat the relation sought after is not sensitive to the knowledge
ntensity involved in the deal. The variables on the diversification
or core business and general) are also not significant pointing
hat the relation is not related to entering into new businesses.
ertaining to the industry, in addition to not being significant, a
omplementary analysis we have conducted and not shown here
hows that the majority of the acquisitions takes place inside the
ndustry (using the 4-digits SIC codes) – that is, in the majority
f the acquisitions the MNCs are not entering a novel business
ut rather extending on the business they already operate.
The results confirm that cultural and financial distance influ-
nce the likelihood of a full acquisition. That is, the grater these
wo distances, the more likely the MNCs will prefer to take full
wnership of their acquisitions in Brazil. Hence, we found par-
ial evidence for the impact of some institutional dimensions on
he equity stake selected and specifically, that greater cultural
istance (model 11) leads MNCs to acquire the totality of the
razilian target firms. These results may seem unconventional
iven the possible expectation that under conditions of greater
ncertainty the MNCs would prefer to share the risks with local
t
i
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artners – which would lead to partial acquisitions. However,
he results are compatible with the arguments related to the
ransaction costs of operating in emerging economies and the
etter protection to the proprietary resources of the MNCs using
odels of full control of the operations in emerging economies.
Only the geographic distance is related to the likelihood that
he acquisitions will entail a partial equity stake of the Brazilian
ubsidiary. Possibly geographic distance increases the difficul-
ies in controlling and managing a more distant subsidiary, in
ddition to the costs that arise from distance and that the com-
unication technologies cannot overcome. In these instances, a
ocal partner may be a viable alternative.
We fail to confirm significant effects for the possible impact
n the degree of equity ownership of economic, political,
dministrative, demographic, knowledge, and global connec-
ions distances. Notwithstanding, it is not surprising that these
nstitutional dimensions reveal as less relevant in selecting the
quity stake. At least in part, these institutional dimensions
re more explicit and easier to observe and thus represent less
ncertainty (see Rodriguez et al., 2005). In other words, the
ncertainty and risk associated to these dimensions may be more
asily identified, analyzed and incorporated in the very market
election decision. Therefore, the decision to enter Brazil by
eans of an acquisition predictably already considered these
ncertainties.
iscussion
In this study, we examined the influence of institutional
istance on the degree of equity ownership acquired in cross-
order acquisitions. This study proposed that MNCs might react
trategically to high levels of external institutional uncertainty
sing structural solutions. We have specifically proposed that
he MNCs will acquire the totality of the target’s equity in con-
itions of high institutional uncertainty in emerging economies.
his study, based on secondary data collected from SDC Plat-
num, analyzed and permitted to conclude that in conditions of
nstitutional uncertainty – with distinct effects for the various
nstitutional dimensions – the MNCs tend to acquire the full
cquisition of the target Brazilian firms.
The results that sustain a positive effect of cultural and
nancial distance warrant additional considerations. First, they
onfirm that MNCs acquire greater equity ownership in the
oreign subsidiaries when some institutional dimensions, specif-
cally cultural and financial, differ more markedly from those of
he home countries of the investor firms. The results contrast with
he common argument that under conditions of higher risk the
NCs prefer to engage in operations committing less resources
o assure lower risk and greater flexibility.
The distance in the financial environment seems to be rele-
ant in the foreign MNCs choice to conduct a full acquisition.
 plausible explanation is that the inefficiencies in the local
nancial market (Brazilian in this case) make it more difficulto obtain complete local financing for the operations. However,
t is pertinent to consider other aspects of the financial environ-
ent such as the uncertainties emerging from such elements as
he instability in the interest rates, exchange rates, monetary
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Table 1
Correlations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Partial acquisition 1.000
2. Acquirer size −0.021 1.000
3. Acquirer high tech −0.058 0.091a 1.000
4. Target high tech −0.033 −0.037 0.650b 1.000
5. Diversification from core
business
0.081a 0.092a −0.011 −0.014 1.000
6. General diversification 0.070 0.058 −0.104b −0.123b 0.404b 1.000
7. Acquisition experience 0.036 0.122b 0.084a 0.054 −0.013 0.077a 1.000
8. Economic dist. −0.048 0.139b 0.060 0.040 0.123b 0.101b −0.027 1.000
9. Financial dist. −0.058 −0.039 0.060 0.024 −0.041 0.055 0.112b 0.279b 1.000
10. Political dist. 0.028 0.204b 0.016 −0.014 0.054 0.004 −0.086a 0.396b −0.004 1.000
11. Administrative dist. 0.053 0.073a −0.066 −0.060 −0.003 0.056 −0.091a 0.098b −0.199b 0.068 1.000
12. Cultural dist. −0.086a 0.020 0.021 0.014 0.039 0.106b −0.170b 0.452b 0.434b 0.115b 0.160b 1.000
13. Demographic dist. 0.013 0.209b 0.044 −0.003 0.031 −0.003 0.113b −0.059 −0.079a −0.203b 0.195b 0.036 1.000
14. Knowledge dist. −0.084a 0.152b 0.105b 0.041 0.041 0.029 −0.085a 0.693b 0.383b 0.587b 0.055 0.489b −0.115b 1.000
15. Global connections dist. −0.042 0.043 −0.033 −0.027 0.012 0.053 −0.137b 0.424b 0.396b 00.091a 0.323b 0.668b −0.030 0.431b 1.000
16. Geographic dist. 0.127b 0.140b −0.120b −0.114b 0.030 0.038 −0.044 0.050 −0.201b 0.257b 0.330b 0.135b 0.329b −0.093a 0.125b 1.000
a Significant at 0.05.
b Significant at 0.01.
Table 2
Logistic regression for the equity ownership acquired.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Acquirer size 0.001 −0.001 0.003 0.008 0.003 −0.003 0.006 −0.004 −0.002 0.011 0.017
Industry 0.878 0.859 0.922 0.878 0.934 1.006 0.913 0.893 0.934 0.879 1.137
Natural resources −0.072 −0.073 −0.059 −0.118 −0.066 −0.041 −0.081 −0.013 −0.048 0.011 −0.014
Services 0.342 0.332 0.339 0.310 0.375 0.469 0.393 0.376 0.385 0.323 0.560
Trade 0.620 0.614 0.708 0.597 0.643 0.817 0.644 0.669 0.689 0.534 0.828
Others 21.325 21.366 21.458 21.233 21.378 21.500 21.433 21.415 21.314 21.555 21.701
Acquirer high tech 0.233 0.229 0.198 0.228 0.211 0.209 0.237 0.211 0.237 0.186 0.152
Target high tech −0.193 −0.196 −0.167 −0.198 −0.204 −0.224 −0.211 −0.183 −0.200 −0.208 −0.289
Diversification from core business −0.282 −0.301 −0.264 −0.272 −0.293 −0.286 −0.275 −0.291 −0.278 −0.265 −0.271
General diversification −0.123 −0.135 −0.148 −0.130 −0.097 −0.184 −0.122 −0.130 −0.140 −0.120 −0.171
Years of acquisition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acqusition experience −0.027 −0.026 −0.038 −0.035 −0.037 0.003 −0.022 −0.021 −0.016 −0.035 0.001
Economic dist. 0.007 −0.004
Financial dist. 0.038a −0.015
Political dist. 0.000 −0.000
Administrative dist. −0.012 −0.011
Cultural dist. 0.299b 0.400b
Demographic dist. −0.012 −0.012
Knowledge dist. 0.010 0.005
Global connections dist. 0.078 −0.003
Geographic dist. −0.000b 0.000
n  736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736
R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08
Chi-quadrado 39.377c 40.102c 43.388c 41.934c 42.976c 49.001c 40.779c 41.283c 41.802c 48.049c 64.272c
a p < 0.05.
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olicies, and so forth that are hazardous for the operations
Capron & Guillén, 2009). Moreover, weak institutions do not
uarantee the quality of the financial information about the target
rms, potential intermediaries (Khanna et al., 2005; Tong, Reuer,
 Peng, 2008), nor about potential efficient incumbent local
artners. In these instances of insecurity regarding the environ-
ent and partners in emerging countries, as Brazil, the foreign
rms are likely to choose fully acquiring a target firm.
Cultural differences are broadly recognized as determinants
f the foreign entry modes, noting that greater cultural differ-
nces tend to lead firms to prefer entry modes involving lower
ommitment of resources (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Morosini et al.,
998). Nonetheless, much of the extant studies explore the pos-
ibility of learning when entering culturally distant countries
Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Ferreira, 2007; Vermeulen &
arkema, 2001). In the emerging economies, possibly the learn-
ng sought is that related to the market and commercialization
l
V
to a large albeit lower income population. Therefore, a solution
f full property may signal that there is no emphasis on learning
ut rather on exploiting the resources and capabilities already
eld by the foreign MNC entering Brazil.
In what concerns the negative effect of geographic distance,
t may not be a surprise that geographic institutional distance is
elated to a higher likelihood of a partial acquisition. It possibly
eflects the difficulties of managing, controlling and coordi-
ating subsidiaries that are geographically distant. In these
nstances a structural solution based on a partnership may be
 rational choice especially when there is low potential of trans-
erring knowledge to the partner. In the data used, the search for
echnological knowledge at the business level does not support
his position. Given the tendency in the literature to observe the
earning potential in acquisitions (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998;
ermeulen & Barkema, 2001), the data and analyzes showed
hat the acquisitions in Brazil have low business level learning
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otential. The evidence for this claim is in the low degree of
usiness-level diversification between acquirer and target firms.
he majority of the acquisitions took place between firms in the
ame business, thus characterizing these as horizontal acquisi-
ions.
Hence, the learning potential is essentially restricted to learn-
ng about the market – for example, how to operate in the
merging economies, how to serve the lower income consumers
 that at the business level. This analysis is relevant for future
esearch insofar as it is important to understand what is the learn-
ng potential at the local level for further absorption and internal
ransfer to other subsidiaries geographically disperse.
onclusion
Research in international business and strategy has already
stablished the importance of understanding the institutional
nvironment and how the differences between the institutional
nvironments impact the choices and strategies of the multina-
ionals. To succeed in the foreign markets the MNCs need to
ave competitive advantages compared to the incumbent local
rms. Foreign MNCs also need to be able to overcome insti-
utional disadvantages. Albeit the current attractiveness of the
merging economies they still suffer from a number of fragilities
nd inefficiencies that may be especially hazardous to overcome
y MNCs that are not familiar with the institutional facets of the
merging economies. In this study, we proposed that at least in
ome instances a manner to overcome institutional uncertainties
ight be in taking structural forms that permit greater adapta-
ion or greater control over the operations. Acquiring a local
rm the foreign MNC may access the intangible resources of
he acquired firm as a manner to augment its local legitimacy.
he potential costs of operating in less efficient and effective
nvironments and the losses of flexibility may be inferior to the
isks of undertaking partial acquisitions in emerging economies
uch as Brazil.
The degree of equity ownership acquired in cross-border
cquisitions by the MNCs entails many strategic considerations
Chari & Chang, 2009). Strategic motivations supported in the
echnological upgrade or in knowledge are possibly imple-
ented through full acquisitions, especially when it is necessary
o control the assets of the target firm (Meyer et al., 2009).
he total ownership avoids that MNCs incur in the coordina-
ion hazards when there is shared property (Chen, 2008), what
ay be especially relevant in institutional contexts where the
egal system is not effective in preventing opportunistic behav-
ors (Williamson, 1985). Total ownership may also be preferred
hen the acquirer MNC seeks to transfer internally knowledge,
esources and competences to the subsidiary (Ferreira, 2007),
nd this concern is higher for investments in less developed
ountries.
Partial acquisitions, in contrast, may be preferred to access
omplementary resources, and when the risk is high or the
nvestments larger (Chari & Chang, 2009). The literature has
ointed that partial acquisitions may promote learning with the
ocal partners (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998), wither learning
bout the business or about the market (Ferreira, 2007). Partial
u
t
f
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cquisitions are also easier to reverse, which may be important
n environments that are more unstable. It is thus reasonable
o seek to better understand how the strategies implemented
hrough cross-border acquisitions vary according to the insti-
utional conditions in the host countries.
This study contributes to the literature on the impact of the
nstitutional environment in the internationalization of firms
Meyer et al., 2011) and in particular in the internationalization
o less developed institutional environments found in the emerg-
ng economies (Khoury & Peng, 2011; Meyer et al., 2009; Peng
t al., 2008). Our results contrast, at least partially, with those
ound in the extant literature that emphasized preferably the
ore developed countries and show that in emerging economies
he entries through full acquisition is the structural response
referred to reduce uncertainty. Hence, there is a contribution
o the construction of an institutional perspective in strategy
Oliver, 1991, 1997; Peng et al., 2009) and a contribution to
he literature on foreign entry modes by analyzing the degree
f equity ownership (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008) without resort-
ng to the more usual studies contrasting among alternative entry
odes, such as comparisons between acquisitions and greenfield
nvestments or joint-ventures. Finally, this study makes a con-
ribution to the research on emerging economies and, although
he empirical context was limited to one host country, it raises
ew perspectives on the need to understand in detail the dif-
culties of operating in those countries. Our study shows that
t is not sufficient to understand aggregate dimensions such as
nstitutional distance, but rather that is necessary a deepening on
he local specificities to capture how the institutional differences
xist and their impact.
imitations  and  future  research  avenues
This study has limitations. First, the limitations imposed by
nsufficiencies in the available data that impede additional anal-
ses. For instance, it would be relevant to consider how the
trategic motivations – market seeking, natural resource seek-
ng, strategic asset seeking (Dunning, 1993) – impact the degree
f equity ownership in acquisitions in context of institutional
ncertainty. Other data potentially relevant include data on the
conomic performance and innovation since, on one side, the
vidence on the impact of acquisitions on firms performance is
ot consensual (Chapman, 2003; Capron & Shen, 2007) and,
n other side, researchers have pointed to the potential that
NCs may reconfigure their portfolio of resources and com-
etences using acquisitions (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996;
yer et al., 2004; Ferreira, 2007; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).
uture research will possibly require data collected through sur-
ey to assess the motivations and the benefits expected from the
cquisitions.
Other limitation concerns the focus on acquisitions in a sin-
le country: Brazil. Future studies in other emerging economies,
r with more than one host country, may provide a better
nderstanding of how MNCs act when expanding into insti-
utionally less developed countries. In a complementary vein,
uture studies may seek to comprehend the investments in south-
outh cross-border acquisitions, that is, acquisitions to and from
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merging economies. Foreign investment still flows mainly from
orth to south, but there may be substantial differences in the
trategic motivations of emerging MNCs.
Finally, using real options theory, in conditions of high uncer-
ainty in the foreign markets it may be better for MNCs to commit
ess resources to maintain flexibility and permit a faster exit
rom the host country if the conditions become more adverse
Tong et al., 2008). Smaller investments may be terminated with
ower costs if the host country conditions are worse than initially
orecasted. However, in institutionally less developed countries
here may be institutional barriers that hinder divestments (Peng
t al., 2009) and make unviable adapting to changing environ-
ental and business conditions. Thus, it is relevant to examine in
uture studies how MNCs may plan their strategies concerning
he equity stakes of their investments to protect from a worsening
f the host institutional conditions.
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